The spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the proliferating East Asian regional trade agreements (RTAs) is worrisome. In particular, the complicated web of hub-and-spoke type of overlapping free trade agreements (FTAs) can result in high costs for verifying rules of origin. As an alternative policy option to avoid the negative effect of trade deflection, customs unions (CUs) should be examined. Most of the theoretical analyses on the formation of CUs highlight stronger positive welfare effects compared to FTAs. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the second-best theory of customs unions. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap by applying two methodologies: an ex ante simulation approach and an ex-post econometric approach. We quantitatively estimate the trade effect of CUs and FTAs by adopting a Gravity regression analysis. In general, we find that a CU is a superior type of RTA to an FTA in terms of creating more intra-bloc trade. In addition to analyzing the trade effects of RTAs according to type, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare and output effects of CUs for East Asia (an ASEANϩ3 CU and a China-Japan-Korea CU) compared to FTAs by applying a computable general equilibrium model analysis. The East Asian CUs adopt a system of common external tariffs (CET) based on simple-averaged, import-weighted, consumption-weighted, and minimum rates. Overall, we find that the ASEANϩ3 CU with the minimum CET are the most desirable type of RTA for both East Asian member countries and the world economy as a whole.
Introduction
The second wave of regionalism 1 has been spreading over an increasingly global world economy. In particular, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been proliferating in East Asia since the outbreak of the ªnancial crisis in 1997. More speciªcally, overlapping bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have proliferated in the region.
Some economists worry about the "noodle bowl syndrome" expected from the overlapping East Asian RTAs. 2 The complicated web of hub-and-spoke type of FTAs can result in high costs for verifying rules of origin (RoO). As an alternative policy option to avoid the negative effect of trade deºection, customs unions (CUs) should be examined. Based on the pioneering works on welfare-improving CUs by Viner (1950) and Kemp and Wan (1976) , most of the theoretical analyses on the formation of CUs highlight stronger positive welfare effects compared to FTAs.
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the second-best theory of customs unions. This paper is an attempt to ªll this gap by applying both a partial equilibrium analysis and a general equilibrium analysis. 3 More speciªcally, we will quantitatively estimate and compare the trade effects of CUs and FTAs by adopting a Gravity regression analysis.
In addition to the analysis of trade effects of RTAs according to type, we will quantitatively evaluate the welfare and output effects of CUs for East Asia (an ASEANϩ3 CU and a China-Japan-Korea CU) compared to FTAs involving the same countries using a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 4 The quantitative analysis of East Asian CUs will adopt a system of common external tariffs (CET) based on simple-averaged, import-weighted, consumption-weighted, and minimum rates.
We will additionally compare the real GDP and welfare effects of different CET settings to ªnd the most desirable determination of CET for a CU in the region.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically reviews the economic effects of CUs compared to FTAs and empirically tests the superiority of CUs over FTAs using Gravity equations. Section 3 descriptively demonstrates the superiority of CUs to FTAs for East Asian countries. Section 4 introduces the CGE model, data, and ex ante scenarios. This section quantitatively measures the effects of the proposed East Asian CUs with different CET systems in comparison to those of East Asian FTAs. Section 5 presents concluding remarks with policy implications.
Free trade agreements versus customs unions

Theoretical review and empirical evidence
RTAs have been revitalized since the successful evolution of the European and the North American integration in the late 1980s. Quite a few theoretical and empirical studies have evaluated the static welfare effects and the dynamic path of RTAs in general. 5 However, there is a lack of analysis of the trade and welfare effects produced by different types of RTAs. Krueger (1995) is a pioneering work on the comparison of different types of RTAs, especially FTAs and CUs. She strongly argues that CUs are "always" better than FTAs by analyzing static net welfare gains and dynamic evolutionary paths. The negative opinion of FTAs is mainly based on the spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the hub-and-spoke type of overlapping FTAs. The welfare-reducing trade diversion effect and the high costs of verifying rules of origin (RoO) may overwhelm the gains from freer trade with FTAs. This additional cost may cause larger negative welfare effects in addition to the traditional trade diversion effect and may not trigger the domino effect of regionalism because of the difªculty in accommodating new entrants into the existing RoO regimes. 6 Mirus and Rylska (2001) support Krueger's argument by carefully describing the costs and the beneªts of FTAs and CUs, focusing on RoO and CET.
More rigorously, Panagariya and Findlay (1996) theoretically compare welfare effects of FTAs and CUs by adopting a modiªed Meade model of endogenous external tariff protection. They argue that a CU is a less protective and welfare superior form of RTA than an FTA. However, similar to Richardson (1994) , they identify a possible free-rider problem in lobbying for protection that makes a CU less effective than an FTA.
As we mentioned earlier, a signiªcant volume of research has been carried out to measure the static net gains from forming RTAs and the dynamic evolution of RTAs toward global free trade. However, despite these theoretical analyses, there has been little empirical work done to prove the superiority of CUs over FTAs. Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008) are exceptions. Both of those studies apply a Gravity regression analysis to measure intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade effects of different types of RTAs. They ªnd that the trade effects are signiªcantly different depending on the RTA type. In particular, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) ªnd that a CU in contrast to an FTA raises more intra-bloc trade but less extra-bloc trade when they estimate with including proposed RTAs. However, the pattern of trade effects are reversed with actual RTAs concerned. Magee (2008) ªnds that the net trade-creating effects of FTAs are greater than CUs but the result is reversed when he estimates the cumulative effects with lags because of the strong post-enactment intra-bloc trade-creating effect and weak anticipatory trade-diverting effect of CUs. Therefore, it remains an open question whether CUs are superior to FTAs in terms of creating more intrabloc trade and diverting less extra-bloc trade. We attempt to ªnd an answer in this section by adopting a Gravity regression analysis.
Gravity regression analysis: Bilateral volume of trade effects 2.2.1 Model speciªcation
We quantitatively estimate the trade effects of CUs and FTAs by using an extended Gravity model of bilateral trade ºows. We extend the typical Gravity model with a number of extra variables. 7 The extended Gravity model has similar speciªcations to that of Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008) in order to measure intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade effects of different types of RTAs.
In particular, we introduce a dummy variable for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to control the indirect trade promoting effects. Rose (2004) Most conventional Gravity models do not distinguish between types of RTAs. In other words, they implicitly assume that all RTAs have the same trade effects. In particular, Aitken (1973) and Frankel (1993 ) introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the two trading countries are both members of the same RTA and zero otherwise. On the other hand, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), Frankel (1997) , and Frankel and Wei (1998) add another dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the bilateral trade between an RTA member and a nonmember country.
where i and j denote particular countries, t denotes time, and
• Trade ijt denotes the average value of the bilateral trade between i and j at time t,
• GDP is a real GDP, • Dist ij is the distance between i and j, • X is a set of control variables including landlocked, border, common language, colony dummy, and area, • GSP is the Generalized System of Preferences dummy, • FTA ij is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to a free trade agreement, • FTAOut ij is a binary variable, which is unity if i belongs to a free trade agreement and j does not or vice versa.
• CU ij is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to a customs union, • CUOut ij is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to a customs union and j does not or vice versa. The error term ⑀ ijt is composed of an individual effect ␦ ij , the time effect t , and a zero mean disturbance u ijt , thus ⑀ ijt ϭ ␦ ij ϩ t ϩ u ijt . Treºer (1993) argues that the formation of RTAs is not exogenously determined. If the presence or absence of RTAs is endogenously determined, an econometric issue in the estimation of trade effects of RTAs incurs an endogeneity problem arising from the correlation of an RTA variable with the error term. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that the omitted variable bias, that is, an unobservable characteristic of countries, is the major source of the endogeneity facing the estimation of RTA effects in Gravity equations using cross-section data. The standard solutions to address the omitted variable bias are using instrumental variables (IV) or the Heckman control function. Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) attempt to adjust for the endogeneity problem using the IV or control function but fail to solve the endogeneity bias. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) estimate the Gravity model in ªrst differences to correct the problem. Haveman and Hummels (1998) , however, indicate that the ªrst-differencing method may not remove the time-varying bias.
Estimation technique
Furthermore, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) show that the omitted variable bias is generated if multilateral trade resistance (expressed in price terms) is ignored in the cross-sectional Gravity equation. The standard way to account for the multilateral price terms is using country-speciªc ªxed effects, as Anderson and Van Wincoop suggest. However, recent studies use panel data rather than cross-section data. Thus, the country-speciªc ªxed effects are not enough to remove the omitted variable bias because the multilateral price terms would vary by time. Therefore, the literature suggests alternative methodologies to deal with this problem. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) discuss the methodologies to adjust the endogeneity bias from a theoretical perspective and suggest introducing the time-varying country dummies in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. However, the ªxed effect OLS technique ignores unobserved heterogeneity and thus the resulting estimates are likely to be biased.
8 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) address the panel estimation with country pair ªxed effects and country-and-time effects. The country pair ªxed effects control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and the countryand-time effects account for the time-varying multilateral price terms. We use this alternative approach to solve the endogeneity problem. Table 1 . Table 2 presents the estimation results of the impact of RTAs on intra-and extra-bloc memberships in general. As we interpret the random effects with time varying country dummies in the ªrst two columns, the conventional variables behave the way the model predicts, and the estimated coefªcients are statistically signiªcant. To summarize brieºy, the estimated coefªcients on bilateral distance, landlocked dummy, and log of area in pairs are signiªcantly negative. The estimated coefªcients on log of GDP in pairs, land border dummy, common language dummy, and colony dummy are all signiªcantly positive. This indicates that the transaction cost and market size matter in creating more bilateral trade.
Estimation results
In fact, our interest is in the impact of RTAs broken down by type. In order to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and the time-varying multilateral price terms, we focus on the estimates reported in column (4) of Table 3 , that is, the county pair ªxed effects with time varying country dummies, as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) use.
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The GSP has a positive trade effect, as we expected, and is statistically signiªcant in most cases, except the case with time varying country dummies in column (4). The estimated coefªcient on the RTA membership dummy variable is positive and statistically signiªcant. The estimate on the intra-bloc membership implies that a pair of countries that joins an RTA experiences an increase in trade of 18.3 percent, with other variables constant. 11 The estimate on the extra-bloc dummy variable is also positive and statistically signiªcant. The estimate implies that RTA members' trade with non-members is estimated to rise by 11.0 percent, reºecting the strong income 125
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10 There are two different estimation techniques in the panel setting: random effects and ªxed effects. The generally accepted way of choosing between ªxed and random effects is performing the Hausman (1978) speciªcation test, which compares the ªxed to random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. We conducted the Hausman test and found that the null hypothesis is rejected, as Egger (2000) ªnds evidence for the rejection of random effects in the Gravity estimation. Therefore, we report here only the results of ªxed effects in Tables 3 and 4. 11 Because e 0.168 ϭ 1.183, an increase from zero (no membership) to one (membership) in the RTA dummy variable raises bilateral trade by 18.3 percent. effects overwhelming the initial substitution effects. Hence, RTAs do create trade among members and do not divert trade from other countries that do not belong to the bloc.
In and regionalization around the world forced the East Asian countries to shift their policy stance from favoring multilateral liberalization to favoring regional trade agreements.
However, there are some obstacles to be considered. The currently proliferating East Asian RTAs have been initiated by proªt-seeking motives, unlike the European case, which was intiated for political and ideological harmonization. It makes the formation of an institutional framework for regional integration difªcult in East Asia. The lack of leadership can be considered another obstacle. As a result, the proposed ASEANϩ3 or ASEANϩ6 RTAs are still under consideration.
Rules of origin and FTAs
As we mentioned earlier in Section 2, however, there is a strong negative opinion against regionalism because of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the hub-and-spoke type of overlapping RTAs, which are common in East Asian FTAs.
14 Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007) estimate the effect of member-speciªc discriminatory trade policies on intra-AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) imports with 15 different preferential margins and emphasize that the additional administration costs to prove origin may exceed the initial cost gain from tariff reduction. In particular, for East Asian FTAs, which include members with a relatively wide range of tariff differentials, they argue that trade deºection using backdoors is likely to be a more serious problem, making it even more complicated to verify RoO. These factors may result in FTAs being protectionist in nature rather than movement toward global free trade.
One more important characteristic of East Asian FTAs we should consider is the relatively stronger intra-regional division of labor. Kuroiwa (2006) shows that the local content of the East Asian production process has declined. Urata (2006) also ªnds development of an increasing vertical intra-industry trade between East Asian countries. Increasing intra-regional trade in manufacturing parts and components is closely connected to the supply chain. The intra-regional division of labor in East Asia over the numerous locations of production facilities may require even more complicated and strict RoO.
East Asian CUs
Salvatore (2007) lists some critical factors that maximize the trade creation effect and minimize the trade diversion effect of CUs. Larger union size, higher pre-union tariff structure between members, lower pre-union tariff structure between members and nonmembers, higher pre-union intra-regional trade, greater substitutability of production structures between members and nonmembers, and geographical proximity will all create larger trade gains. Applying these criteria, we expect that the East Asian CUs will likely produce positive static and dynamic welfare effects.
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In addition, Andresen (2004) analyzes the relative extent of integration among East Asian countries by calculating intra-regional trade share, especially the increasing intra-industry trade and the intra-regional trade of parts and components, compared to Europe at the time of the completion of its customs union. Based on this analysis, he proposes that the East Asian region form a preferential trade agreement such as a free trade area or a CU. In particular, he suggests that an East Asian CU is a more desirable form of RTA, considering the signiªcant external trade relations with large trade blocs like the European Union and the United States. The more farreaching integration relative to FTAs will create more gains from free trade by enhancing the region's bargaining power with extra-East Asian trading partners.
More speciªcally, Plummer (2006) strongly suggests that ASEAN countries move toward the formation of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). He argues that the evolution toward an ASEAN customs union (ACU) will make the region more successful by creating an ASEAN single market. This will have large trade beneªts for the region, as well as attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI) and preventing the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. The formation of an ACU will also improve ASEAN's bargaining power at international forums and raise economic efªciency by reinforcing the reform programs of the members.
In sum, considering the regional characteristics and external relations, harmonizing commercial policy among the regional members and nonmembers is preferable. Both the additional costs of complicated RoO regimes and the necessity of communication between members under FTAs suggest that a more desirable type of RTA for East Asian countries is a CU.
East Asian RTAs: A CGE model analysis
Model and data
In order to search for a more desirable type of RTA in East Asia, we attempt to assess quantitatively the effects of different types of RTAs by adopting a CGE model analysis. In particular, we employ the commonly used GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model as our basic model. This is a standard general equilibrium model that has been extensively used in studies to examine a wide range of trade policy issues. 16 The adopted GTAP model assumes constant returns to scale technology, perfect competition, and a global bank designed to achieve a balance between world savings and investment. The three production factors (land, labor, and capital) are assumed mobile across sectors within a country but not mobile across borders. Aggregate household expenditure is determined as a constant share of total regional income. The household maximizes utility subject to its expenditure constraints. The constant difference of elasticities (CDE) consumer demand system is designed to capture differential price and income responsiveness across countries. International trade is linked through Armington substitution. Product differentiation between imports by region of origin allows for two-way trade across regions in each tradable product.
We work with a multi-sector and multi-region CGE model of the world economy.
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The CGE model is calibrated using the GTAP database version 6, which represents 18 We do a comparative static analysis of the welfare and GDP effects on the regional economies considered before and after changes in trade regimes.
Scenarios 4.2.1 Regional trade agreements
In order to quantitatively compare the welfare and GDP effects of different types of East Asian RTAs on each of the member countries, members as a whole, nonmembers, and the world economy, we consider a Northeast Asian RTA that competes with the existing Southeast Asian RTA (AFTA) and an East Asian RTA with which both regions are cooperating. The following four RTA scenarios are examined empirically:
• CJK FTA: An FTA between China, Japan, and Korea • ASEANϩ3 FTA: An FTA between ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea • CJK CU: A CU between China, Japan, and Korea • ASEANϩ3 CU: A CU between ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea
For each of the scenarios, both import tariffs and export taxes between members will be eliminated, but the trade barriers between members and nonmembers will be retained.
Common external tariffs
A CU imposes a CET on importables from nonmembers. According to the applied assumptions for the determination of the CET, the structure of a CU is different. Since Viner (1950) and Kemp and Wan (1976) proved the existence of welfare-improving CUs with CET and a system of lumpsum compensatory payment, some theoretical analyses on the determination of CET have been done. Bhagwati (1991) proposes that a CU should set its CET at the minimum of the pre-union members' import tariffs to satisfy GATT Article XXIV. However, Srinivasan (1997) and Krueger (1995) suggest that the CET should be maintained at the pre-union average level. Syropoulos (2003) builds a model for the endogenous relationship between distribution rules of tariff revenues between CU members and the determination of CET preferences with special attention to factor abundance. He ªnds that CET should be set at the most-preferred tariff of the member with the median capital/labor ratio. Moreover, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001) FTA) with three different vectors of CET: simple arithmetic average, importweighted average, and production-weighted average, assuming NAFTA evolves into a CU by using the Michigan CGE model. They ªnd that the effects of the theoretical North American CU will heavily depend on the CET measures implemented.
We consider the following four sets of CET rates for the proposed East Asian RTAs:
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• Simple average of members' import tariffs against nonmembers;
• Import-weighted average of members' import tariffs against nonmembers;
• Consumption-weighted average of members' import tariffs against nonmembers;
• Minimum of members' import tariffs against nonmembers.
Using the trade barriers (tf ij ) presented in the GTAP database, we calculate the common external tariffs under above-mentioned four alternative measures. The weighted-averaged CETs are calculated as CET s tf i i j i j i = ∑ where s ij is the import (or consumption) share of country j (ASEANϩ3 or China, Japan and Korea) in industry i.
The calculated CET of the CJK CU and the ASEANϩ3 CU are shown in Table 5 . We ªnd some interesting characteristics from the calculated CET of the East Asian CUs. First, there is a great deal of variance in the CETs, especially in primary and laborintensive products such as Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing, Beverage, and Textile and Clothing. In particular, the tariff for Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing is highly affected by which measure is used in the calculation of the CET. For example, in the case of the ASEANϩ3 CU, if the CET rate is calculated by the import-weighted average, then it amounts to 12.99 percent. However, if the CET rate is determined by the minimum, this rate is only 1.30 percent. Second, following the case of minimum CET rate, the CET estimated by consumption-weighted average is mostly balanced and lowest on average and the import-weighted average CET is mostly unbalanced and highest on average. Third, as we compare the CJK CU with the ASEANϩ3 CU, the ASEANϩ3 CU has a relatively higher and wider CET system for nonmembers. This
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19 Unlike the free riding effort of lobbying for protection in Panagariya and Findlay (1996) and Richardson (1994) as we mentioned in section 2.1, if the lobbying effort becomes successful, a CU may raise the CET and make the CU more protective than an FTA. In order to analyze the case, we may include one more CET system into our simulation analysis, for example, maximum of members' import tariffs against nonmembers. It is hypothetically possible but it is not a realistic scenario considering GATT Article XXIV. However, we examined (but did not report) the case and found that the welfare effects of the CUs are worse than those of the corresponding FTAs.
is reasonable if we consider the signiªcant gaps in development levels of member countries in the ASEANϩ3 CU.
Simulation results
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4.3.1 Welfare and output effects Country-speciªc effects are not reported because the main objective of this research is to compare the effectiveness of different types of RTAs for members, nonmembers, and the world as a whole. However, for the most desirable type of RTA, we will report the countryspeciªc effects as a reference in Tables 6 and 7 . 21 We would like to acknowledge that the CGE model analysis examined in this paper focused more on the beneªt side of the trade liberalization. The additional verifying costs of origins are not included in its estimation of trade costs. It will overestimate the gains from the formation of the East Asian FTAs. It can be a reason why the additional gains from the formation of the proposed East Asian CUs are not signiªcantly large compared with the corresponding FTAs. We also acknowledge some limitations of this research. In particular, we may need to perform usual sensitivity tests for the CGE model analysis with different macro-closure rules and parameter values for more robust results. The speciªcation of both the Gravity and CGE model could be diversiªed and tested for dynamic effects. This paper, however, is not an exhaustive study of economic modeling but, rather, is an empirical investigation to compare the relative performance of types of RTAs. Thus, we leave these additional concerns for future research. In Table 6 , we note that the formation of a CU in East Asia has insigniªcant effects on nonmembers in terms of real GDP. However, the impact on nonmembers' welfare is somewhat different. When the minimum tariffs are adopted as the common external tariffs of a CU, the nonmembers experience the largest decline in the welfare. This is because the worsened terms of trade effect exceeds the efªciency effect.
Let us turn to a discussion of the impact of CET measures. There is no difference between the real GDP and welfare effects of FTAs and CUs with an import-weighted CET system. For the ASEANϩ3 CU, the real GDP for members increases by 0.27 percent for the minimum tariffs, whereas it ranges from 0.23 percent to 0.25 percent for the alternative CET system. With the minimum tariffs, the largest global welfare is also induced. The adoption of minimum CET rates may be an appropriate choice for the maximization of members' welfare as well as world welfare. These results imply that a CU with the minimum CET is the optimum RTA strategy for East Asian countries. Table 7 summarizes the likely impacts of the most desirable East Asian RTA, an ASEANϩ3 CU, on each member's economy. In terms of welfare and real GDP, Korea as the smallest country has the largest gains from freer trade, and Japan as the most advanced and liberalized country in terms of import tariffs has the smallest gains. The ASEAN's gains are larger than China's. The ASEANϩ3 CU raises intra-regional trade from a minimum of 4.24 percent for ASEAN to a maximum of 19.03 percent for China.
Country-speciªc effects of the ASEANϩ3 CU
The effect of the ASEANϩ3 CU on output production by sector is summarized in Table 8 . East Asian regional integration restructures the regional industrial structure based on each economy's comparative advantages. ASEAN's and China's primary industries, Japan's advanced manufacturing industries, and Korea's light manufacturing industries will achieve more gains. The more disaggregated sectoral classiªcation will provide accurate sector-speciªc and country-speciªc effects, which is not a main objective of this paper. 
Concluding remarks
In order to support the second-best theory of CU, we quantitatively estimated the trade effect of CUs and FTAs by using a Gravity regression analysis and found that CUs raise more intra-bloc trade and less extra-bloc trade compared to FTAs.
For the East Asian case (both for the China-Japan-Korea RTAs and the ASEANϩ3 RTAs), we quantitatively evaluated the welfare and output effects of CUs compared to FTAs by applying a CGE model analysis. From our experiments, we found:
(i) the effects of the proposed East Asian CUs heavily depend on the CET measures applied; (ii) the East Asian CUs, especially with the minimum CET rates, generate signiªcant net trade-creating effects but worse nonmembers' welfare; (iii) both positive welfare and real GDP effects of the East Asian CUs on members outweigh those of the East Asian FTAs; (iv) the global welfare and output gains from the East Asian CUs are larger than those from the East Asian FTAs; and (v) an ASEANϩ3 CU with the minimum CET is the most desirable type of RTA for both the East Asian member countries and the world economy as a whole. 
